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The prevalence of consumer arbitration as the dispute resolution
mechanism of choice for business in North America' may be at risk, at
least north of the border. In the three most populous Canadian provinces,
Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, legislators and judges have
declared clauses imposing arbitration unenforceable, preserving
consumers' access to courts and, perhaps more significantly, access to
class actions. In so doing, these jurisdictions stand in stark contrast to
the Supreme Court of Canada, which recently extended its pro-arbitration
posture from the commercial to the consumer law realm by enforcing an
arbitration clause in an online consumer contract, thereby putting an end
to the consumer's attempt to file a class action against the vendor.
Absent the contrary provincial laws, this judgment would have signaled
convergence between the U.S. and Canada on consumer arbitration,
* Associate Professor and Member of the Institute of Comparative Law, Faculty of
Law, McGill University, Montreal. I would like to thank my colleague Frederic Bachand
for many lively and challenging discussions that we've had concerning consumer
arbitration. Of course, the views expressed here are mine alone.
1. In a recent empirical study in the U.S., over 75% of consumer contracts included
such clauses. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily L. Sherwin,
Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
and Nonconsumer Contracts, Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08017; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-28, at 6. I have found no
equivalent empirical studies for Canada.
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particularly in a transborder context. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court
has consistently held that arbitration clauses in interstate consumer
contracts are subject to the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, which does not
allow for different treatment according to the nature of the contract,
thereby pre-empting any State law providing special rules for consumer
dispute resolution. In the absence of similar federal arbitration law in
Canada, however, the Canadian Supreme Court's endorsement of predispute mandatory arbitration in consumer disputes cannot effect
uniformity within the country, let alone on the North American market.
In order to examine the current legal landscape for consumer
arbitration in Canada, I will begin by providing an overview of the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union
des consommateurs. I will then move to a consideration of the divergent
policies expressed in legislation and judgments from the three provinces
mentioned above. In the third section of the paper, I will examine the
evolving post-Dell case law. This will highlight the extent to which
courts are currently struggling to reconcile these conflicting policy
positions. The challenge is most evident in those provinces where
provincial legislation preserving consumers' access to courts is in place,
but does not apply to the particular litigation which arose prior to its
coming into force. The resulting ambiguity will be familiar to American
jurists conversant with divergent state case law on pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration and class-action waivers in consumer contracts. 2 I will close
with a brief look at other proposed models for consumer dispute
resolution in Europe and in the Americas against whose backdrop our
respective supreme courts may appear rather uncivilized indeed!
I.

DELL COMPUTERS; OR THE TRIUMPH OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

The Supreme Court of Canada recently ruled on the binding effect
of a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in a standard form
consumer contract in litigation involving Dell Computers. 3 A number of
consumers had sought to conclude an online purchase of computer
equipment. The equipment was initially advertised at the wrong price,
an error that the merchant sought to rectify as soon as it became aware of
the mistake on the vendor's main website. Despite the correction, the
2. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 264-95
(Juris Publishing 2007).
3.
Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34,
(S.C.C. 2007). Available free online at www.canlii.org as are all other Canadian cases
discussed here. All Supreme Court of Canada judgments are available in English;
decisions from other courts are not translated and therefore may be available only in
French if drafted in that language.
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plaintiffs were able to make their purchases at the erroneous price by
skillful internet browsing. 4 When Dell later sought to rescind the online
orders, the purchasers launched a class action, claiming that Dell was
obligated under applicable consumer protection legislation to sell them
the products at the significantly lower advertised price. Dell objected to
the action, invoking a mandatory arbitration clause included in its
generally applicable terms and conditions of sale.5
The case raised four questions that parallel those asked in this type
of litigation in the United States: (i) was the arbitration clause part of the

online purchase contract; (ii) was the dispute arbitrable; (iii) was the
arbitration clause invalid or unenforceable for reasons related to its

inclusion in a (standard-form) consumer contract; and (iv) was the
arbitration clause unenforceable because the policy favoring class actions

supersedes the policy favoring arbitration, at least in the consumer law
field?6

4. The consumers used so-called "deep links" to access the products, without going
through Dell's normal home pages or advertising pages; this allowed them to get around
the blocks on purchases set up by Dell after it had discovered the pricing errors. Dell, 2
S.C.R. 801, at para. 4.
5. The clause in question read as follows:
Arbitration. ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY (WHETHER
IN CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE, WHETHER PREEXISTING,
PRESENT OR FUTURE, AND INCLUDING STATUTORY, COMMON
LAW, INTENTIONAL TORT AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS CAPABLE IN
LAW OF BEING SUBMITTED TO BINDING ARBITRATION) AGAINST
DELL, its agents, employees, officers, directors, successors, assigns or
affiliates (collectively for purposes of this paragraph, "Dell") arising from or
relating to this Agreement, its interpretation, or the breach, termination or
validity thereof, the relationships between the parties, whether pre-existing,
present or future, (including, to the full extent permitted by applicable law,
relationships with third parties who are not signatories to this Agreement),
Dell's advertising, or any related purchase SHALL BE RESOLVED
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION
ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM ("NAF")
under its Code of Procedure and any specific procedures for the resolution of
small claims and/or consumer disputes then in effect (available via the Internet
at http://www.arb-forum.com/, or via telephone at 1-800-474-2371). The
arbitration will be limited solely to the dispute or controversy between
Customer and Dell. Any award of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on
each of the parties, and may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction. Information may be obtained and claims may be filed with the
NAF at P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, MN 55405, or by e-mail at file@arbforum.com, or by online filing at http://www.arb-forum.com/.
Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 127.
6. For a general discussion of recent U.S. law on this question, see CARBONNEAU,
supra note 2. While the arbitration clause does not include an explicit class action
waiver, the limitation of claims to those "between customer and Dell" is equivalent and
not denied by Dell.
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At first instance, the Quebec Superior Court rejected Dell's motion
requesting that the court decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to
arbitration.7 The Court ruled that the arbitration clause was not binding
on the purchaser because of a jurisdictional rule protecting consumers'
access to courts of their home residence (thereby answering yes to the
third question). 8
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal denied Dell's request for
arbitration but not on the basis of the jurisdictional rule invoked by the
first court. 9 Instead, the Court of Appeal declared that the arbitration
clause was "external" to the main contract.' 0 Under Quebec contract
law, such a clause would be enforceable in a consumer contract only if it
had been brought specifically to the attention of the consumer." The
Court of Appeal held that the reference to arbitration in the Terms and
Conditions of Sale, accessible via a hyperlink on the main website, did
not meet the requisite criteria. 12
As a result, the clause was
unenforceable under applicable Quebec contract law. The court did not
address the issue of arbitrability or resolve the potential conflict between
class actions and arbitration policy. The court's response was thus a
combination of the first and third questions above, and involved
considerations relating to the online context of the purchase and the
nature of the contract.
On a further, and final, appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada
reversed the outcome in the lower courts, rejecting their legal
conclusions and providing revised answers to all four of the questions

7. Union des consommateurs and Olivier Dumoulin v. Dell Computer Corp., 2004
CanLII 32168 (Que. Super. Ct.). That court went on to certify the class action.
8. Id. at para. 33-37. The jurisdiction rule is provided by article 3149 of the Civil
Code of Quebec that reads as follows:
A Quebec authority also has jurisdiction to hear an action involving a consumer
contract or a contract of employment if the consumer or worker has his
domicile or residence in Quebec; the waiver of such jurisdiction by the
consumer or worker may not be set up against him.
Civil Code of Quebec, 1991 S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3149 (my emphasis).
9. Dell Computer Corp. c. Union des consommateurs, [2005] R.J.Q. 1448, QCCA
570 (Que. C.A.).
10. Id. at para. 33.
11. Article 1435 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides as follows:
An external clause referred to in a contract is binding on the parties.
In a consumer contract or a contract of adhesion, however, an external clause is
null if, at the time of formation of the contract, it was not expressly brought to
the attention of the consumer or adhering party, unless the other party proves
that the consumer or adhering party otherwise knew of it.
C.c.Q., 1991 S.Q., ch. 64, art. 1435.
12. Dell Computer, [2005] R.J.Q. 1448, at para. 43-46.
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stated in the previous paragraph. 3 The end result was to
send each
4
consumer to face Dell in individual arbitration proceedings.'
On the first question involving the inclusion of the arbitration clause
within the contract of sale, the Supreme Court held that the reference to
the arbitration clause through a hyperlink did not fall afoul of the rule on
"external" clauses in consumer contracts provided by the Civil Code of
Qurbec.15 Its reasoning on this point is not incompatible with
comparable U.S. decisions, although its failure to distinguish "browsewrap" from "clip-wrap" mechanisms is unfortunate.' 6 The Court quickly
dismissed the second question, concluding that consumer disputes were
not inarbitrable per se. 17 As for the third question, a majority of the
Court held that the plaintiffs could not benefit from the jurisdictional
protection accorded to consumers in article 3149 of the Civil Code of
Quebec ("C.c.Q.") because the arbitration involved was not "foreign,"
given that it could take place in Qurbec. 18 On the fourth question, the
Court held unanimously that class actions were merely a procedural
vehicle that could not act as a public policy bar to the enforcement of the
arbitration clause. 19 The overall outcome is therefore strikingly similar
to that reached by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2005
involving the same defendant and an only slightly different arbitration
clause.2 °

13. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007
SCC 34 (S.C.C.).
14. As is often the case, it is difficult to discover whether or not these arbitration
proceedings are forthcoming.
15. Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 101.
16. A "browse-wrap" contract is one which does not require a specific and separate
step in the contracting process expressing consent. A "click-wrap" contract is one where
prior to the conclusion of the contract, the consumer is required to agree expressly to the
terms and conditions of the contract by way of a mouse click usually placed beside the
terms "I agree." On the relevance of this distinction here, see Philippa Lawson & Cintia
Rose de Lima, "Browse-wrap" Contracts and Unfair Terms: What the Supreme Court
Missed in Dell Computer Corporation v. Union des consommateurs et Dumoulin, 37
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 445 (2007).

17. Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 62-63 (majority) and 219 (minority).
18. Id. at para. 66. The text of the provision is provided above in note 5. In so
doing, the court held that the factual matrix of the case put it outside the scope of
application of art. 3149 C.c.Q. which is triggered only in the face of a "relevant" foreign
element. See C.c.Q., 1991 S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3149. For a critique of this view in law and
on the facts, see Genevieve Saumier, L 'affaire Dell: La sphdre d'applicationde I'article
3149 C.c.Q. et le consommateur qu~bcois, 37 REVUE GtNERALE DE DROIT 6 (2007).

19. Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 105-10. As will be discussed below, the Quebec
legislature had amended its consumer protection legislation to give priority to court
actions, including class actions, over arbitration; however, the Supreme Court concluded
that the relevant transitional rules made those amendments inapplicable to the case and of
no assistance to the plaintiffs. See discussion infra.
20. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (5th Cir. 2005).
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While the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the fourth question
rather easily, case law before and since its decision involves that very
issue, warranting further consideration of the Supreme Court's reasoning
on this point in the Dell judgment. For its review of the potential clash
between class actions legislation and arbitration law, the Canadian
Supreme Court was faced with a number of potentially relevant sources:
the Civil Code of Quebec, 2' the Code of Civil Procedure,22 the Quebec
Act Respecting the Class Action23 and the Commercial Arbitration Act.24
The Court first noted that no mention of the relation between the two
methods of dispute resolution (class action or arbitration) was
discernable from the relevant sources. 25 In fact, the Civil Code of
Quebec provision on arbitrability (article 2639) does not specifically
exclude consumer disputes from its scope.26 Moreover, the Court
refused to include consumer disputes within the residual category of
matters of "public order" deemed to be inarbitrable under article 2639.27
In addition, the Court noted that the Code of Civil Procedure dealt
specifically with arbitration, including the role of courts, without any
reference to any limitations that might shield other types of judicial
recourse from the ambit of arbitration.28 Its analysis of arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism focused on doctrine and precedent related
to commercial disputes and to interpretations connected to international
instruments such as the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL
Model Arbitration Law. 29 The Court did not draw any distinctions
between arbitration clauses in negotiated commercial contracts and those
included in standard-form consumer contracts.
The judicial reasoning underlying the decision in Dell Computers
reflects a view of arbitration that is largely consistent with the position
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court since its landmark Mitsubishi
21. C.c.Q., 1991 S.Q., ch. 64.
22. R.S.Q., ch. C-25 (articles 940 to 952 deal with arbitration while articles 9991051 deal with the class action procedure including the certification process).
23. R.S.Q., ch. R-2.1 (this statute regulates access to public funding for class actions;
the Supreme Court did not actually refer to this statute in its reasons).
24. R.S.C. 1985, ch. 17 (1985) (2nd Supp.).
25. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007
SCC 34.
26. Article 2639 C.c.Q. states: "Disputes over the status and capacity of persons,
family matters or other mattes of public order may not be submitted to arbitration. An
arbitration may not be opposed on the ground that the rules applicable to settlement of the
dispute are in the nature of rules of public order." See C.c.Q., 1991 S.Q., ch. 64, art.
2639.
27. Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 109.
28. Id. at para. 38-53.
29. Id. at para. 38-48. Both instruments are part of Quebec (and Canadian) law and
are specifically mentioned in article 940.6 C.C.P. as relevant interpretational sources for
internationalcommercial arbitration.
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judgment in 1985.30 Canada's highest court's findings could therefore be
imagined as leading to a greater harmonization of arbitration law within
the Canada/U.S. legal space. That, in turn, could appear to favor
transborder commerce by reducing the potential diversity of applicable
legal regimes and allowing for a uniform dispute resolution mechanism
imposed by the vendor regardless of the location of the purchaser. The
utility of such a legal context for internet sales is obvious.
This conclusion can be challenged, however, given that the position
of principle put forward by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dell is
ineffective in two of the three largest provincial economies in the country
because of statutory enactments: Ontario and Quebec.3' Until very
recently, appellate courts in British Columbia had also adopted a position
of principle contrary to the one taken in Dell.32 Still, as in the U.S., the
highest court in Canada can affect statutory interpretation by provincial
courts where the issue is within its authority. In fact, since Dell,
provincial courts in Canada have been grappling with its effect in
provinces without explicit legislation on consumer arbitration clauses.
Even in Quebec and Ontario, litigation has continued despite the
presence of legislation because of ambiguity on the application of the
new laws on long-term consumer service contracts. I turn now to a
consideration of these issues and the signals they may send concerning
the future of consumer arbitration in Canada.
II.

THE DIVERGING

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE VIEWS ON CONSUMER

ARBITRATION IN CANADA

In both Ontario and Quebec, the provincial legislatures recently
adopted modifications to their respective consumer protection acts in
order to limit the effect of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in consumer
contracts. This was
done in advance of the Supreme Court's decision in
33
Dell Computers.
The Ontario statute provides for the following limitation on
arbitration in the consumer context:

30.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)

(statutory rights can be the subject of consensual arbitration).
31. Provincial legislatures have exclusive jurisdiction over consumer protection law
and civil procedure under Canadian constitutional law. See PETER HOGG, CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2007).

32. Viewed in these terms, the landscape in Canada reflects a diversity of
perspectives on consumer arbitration that is actually closer to the American reality than
the Mitsubishijurisprudence may suggest. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2.
33. While the Ontario amendments had come into force the summer before the
hearing, the Quebec amendments came into force the day after! Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at
para. 8.
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7. (1) The substantive and procedural rights given under this Act
apply despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary.
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), any term or
acknowledgment in a consumer agreement or a related agreement
that requires or has the effect of requiring that disputes arising out of
the consumer agreement be submitted to arbitration is invalid insofar
as it prevents a consumer from exercising a right to commence an
action in the Superior Court of Justice given under this Act.
(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), after a dispute over which a
consumer may commence an action in the Superior Court of Justice
arises, the consumer, the supplier and any other person involved in
the dispute may agree
to resolve the dispute using any procedure that
34
is available in law.
In other words, consumer disputes are not inarbitrable since section 7(3)
specifically preserves the legality of consumer arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism. Rather, the section seeks to prohibit pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clauses, typically included in standard form
consumer contracts. If a dispute arises after a contract has been entered
into, the consumer may then agree to refer the dispute to arbitration.35
The Quebec legislation is largely similar, though more concise:
11.1. Any stipulation that obliges the consumer to refer a dispute to
arbitration, that restricts the consumer's right to go before a court, in
particular by prohibiting the consumer from bringing a class action,
or that deprives the consumer of the right to be a member of a group
bringing a class action is prohibited.
If a dispute arises after a contract has been entered' 36into, the consumer
may then agree to refer the dispute to arbitration."
Since these provisions are included in provincial consumer protection
legislation, their applicability to a transborder consumer dispute will
depend on whether the contract is subject to either province's substantive
law. Under choice-of-law analysis in Ontario and Quebec, the local
statute would normally apply only upon a conclusion that the law of that
province was the law applicable to the contract.37 Alternatively, one
34. Consumer Protection Act 2002, S.O., ch. 30, sch. A ("Ontario CPA"). (Most
Canadian judicial and statutory sources are available free online at www.canlii.org.).
35. Id. at art. 11.1
36. Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., ch. P-40.1 ("Quebec CPA"). The Ontario act
also prohibits limitations relating to class actions. See 2002 S.O., ch. 30, s.8.
37. In Ontario this would follow from an identification of the "law most closely
connected to the contract."

See generally JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL & JANET

WALKER,
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could argue that the CPA provisions are rules of procedural or
jurisdictional law, always reserved to the lexfori, thereby applicable to
any defendant's motion to suspend the judicial procedures in Ontario or
Quebec and send the parties to arbitration. 38 A further argument would
be available in Quebec through an appeal to the obvious public policy
nature of the statutory rule which would give that rule priority over the
law applicable to the contract 39
Given that these statutory provisions have only recently come into
force, courts have had little occasion to consider their impact on
consumer dispute resolution. Where plaintiffs have invoked the new
provisions to avoid arbitration, courts have had to grapple with the
question of their retroactive application. The Supreme Court's decision
in Dell Computers had declared that the Quebec amendments did not
apply retroactively. 40 However that case only dealt with a single
executed transaction as opposed to an ongoing contractual relation;
moreover it only applied to the Quebec statute. Since Dell Computers,
Quebec courts have interpreted the non-retroactivity conclusion broadly,
refusing to give way to arguments that it might only apply to disputes
arising prior to the enactment of the statutory provision, even when the
disputes involve long-term ongoing service contracts. 4"
In Ontario, the trial court in Smith v. National Money Mart Co dealt
with the retroactivity issue at length, concluding that the new rules did
apply to an ongoing service contract.42 Nevertheless, the trial judge went
CANADIAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS ch. 31 (6th ed. 2005). In Quebec, the choice-of-law rule
for consumer contracts is provided in article 3117 C.c.Q. which allows for party
autonomy but preserves the protective provisions of Quebec consumer law in particular
circumstances.
38. A trial judge in Ontario has just concluded that s. 7 is not merely procedural
because it removes a substantive right to contract for arbitration. Smith v. Nat'l Money
Mart Co., 2008 CanLII 27479 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 115. In that case, the court held that
the provision applied retroactively so as to render invalid an arbitration clause in an
executed contract. In Quebec, see art. 3130 C.c.Q.
39. This argument would involve an appeal to Art. 3076 C.c.Q. that imported into
Quebec private international law the notion of internationally mandatory rules originally
codified in art. 7(2) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations.
40. As noted previously, amendments to the Quebec consumer protection legislation
would render unenforceable the arbitration clause at issue if included in a newly
concluded consumer contract. In Dell, the Supreme Court held that those amendments
did not have any retroactive effect. Dell, 2 S.C.R. 801, at para. 111-19.
41. See Fortin c. Rogers Communication sans-fil inc., 2008 QCCS 3855 CanLII
(July 15, 2008); 9064-1622 Qu6bec inc. c. Soci6t& Telus Commc'n (Telus Mobilit&),
2008 QCCS 2975 CanLIl (July 4, 2008).
42. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 CanLII 27479 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 10126, affid on other grounds 2008 ONCA 746, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada dismissed with costs on 5 March 2009, 2009 CanLII 8845 (S.C.C.). As discussed
further below, the Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly declined to address the retroactivity
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on to consider the effect of Dell Computers in Ontario in the event his
conclusion on retroactivity was mistaken. In so doing, he relied quite
heavily on British Columbia case law discussing the relationship
between class actions and arbitration.4 s Since that case law predated the
Dell decision, it is worth looking at the pre-Dell jurisprudence to better
understand the post-Dell situation in the common law provinces.4 4
The first appellate court to give precedence to class action
legislation over arbitration legislation was the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in MacKinnon v. National Money Mart.4 5 American readers
familiar with consumer arbitration and class actions will not be surprised
to learn that the payday loan industry has faced complaints in Canada of
usurious interest rates largely similar to those made against it in the
United States.46 In both countries, defendants objected to certification
motions on the grounds that consumers were bound by contractual
arbitration clauses, which restricted them to individual arbitration
proceedings to advance their claims.
The B.C. court noted the absence, in either the class actions
legislation or the arbitration legislation, of specific statutory language
that would answer the question of priority between the two. 47 In so
doing, the court noted that the class action statute required that
certification be granted upon satisfaction of the conditions set therein.48

issue, having been able to dispose of the motion to refer the parties to arbitration on the
basis of an issue estoppel argument.
43. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 CanLII 27479 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 128
and ff.
44. Interestingly, one of the earliest decisions on the issue of consumer arbitration
came from Ontario and presaged the Supreme Court's decision in Dell. In Kanitz v.
Rogers Cable Inc., [2002] 58 O.R.3d 299 (Ont. S.C.J.), an Ontario judge had concluded
that in the absence of any clear statutory preference for class actions over arbitration, the
arbitration clause was enforceable under existing arbitration law. For a detailed
discussion of the law pre-Dell, see J. Watson Hamilton, Pre-Dispute Consumer
Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 McGILL L.J. 694 (2006); for a brief
review, see Genevieve Saumier, Consumer Dispute Resolution: The Evolving Canadian
Landscape, 1:4 CLASS ACTION DEF. Q. 52 (2007).
45. [2004] 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291 (B.C. C.A.) (claim that contract is invalid as unlawful
under state criminal law to be heard by arbitrator, as it does not affect the validity of the
severable arbitration clause).
46. See Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
47. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., [2004] 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291, at para. 46.
48. British Columbia's Class Proceedings Act states:
§ 4(1) The court must certify a proceeding as a class proceeding on an
application under section 2 or 3 if all of the following requirements are met:
... (d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the fair and
efficient resolution of the common issues; ...
(2) In determining whether a class proceeding would be the preferable
procedure for the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues, the court
must consider all relevant matters including the following: ...

2009]

CONSUMER ARBITRATION

1213

The statutory requirement regarding certification was viewed as
incompatible with the defendant's claim that the arbitration clause should
be given automatic effect.49 Indeed, if the arbitration clause were
enforced, the opportunity of considering whether certification ought to be
granted would be excluded. The court considered instead that the two
statutes could be reconciled by assessing the appropriateness of
arbitration within the certification process, under the "preferability"
aspect of the certification evaluation. 50 In other words, if arbitration was
a preferable means of resolving the disputes between the parties, then
certification would not be ordered. In contrast, should arbitration not be
preferable to the collective action, the arbitration clause would be
declared to be "inoperative," an option specifically provided for under
the applicable arbitration statute. 51 The court thus found that the referral
to arbitration could not be considered prior to the motion for
certification; rather, the two had to be considered concurrently:
52 It is only when the court has completed its analysis of the
certification application and determines that it must certify the
proceeding as a class proceeding that it can legally conclude that the
arbitration agreement is "inoperative." It is inoperative because the
court, following the direction of the Legislature, has determined that
the class proceeding is the "preferable procedure" and the other
requirements for certification have been met.
53 Thus, the applications for a stay and for certification of the class
proceeding must be dealt with together. The outcomes of the two
applications are interdependent: the mandatory terms of the Class
Proceedings Act mean that arbitration and class proceedings cannot
operate at the same time with respect to the same dispute. On the
other hand, if the proceeding is not certified as a class proceeding,

(d) whether other means of resolving the claims are less practical or less
efficient; ...
Class Proceedings Act, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 50 (emphasis added).
49. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., [2004] 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291, at para. 22-24.
50. Id. at para. 46.
51. Id. at para. 52-53.
British Columbia's Commercial Arbitration Act states:
§ 15 (1) If a party to an arbitration agreement commences legal proceedings in

a court against another party to the agreement in respect of a matter agreed to
be submitted to arbitration, a party to the legal proceedings may apply, before
or after entering an appearance and before delivery of any pleadings or taking
any other step in the proceedings, to that court to stay the legal proceedings.
(2) In an application under subsection (1), the court must make an order staying
the legal proceedings unless it determines that the arbitration agreement is void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
Commercial Arbitration Act, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 55 (emphasis added).
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there may be 52no basis for saying that the arbitration agreement is
"inoperative."
It is easy to predict that where the consumer claims involve small
amounts, aggregation is likely to be "preferable" to individual arbitration
as a means of resolving the claims, particularly in terms of access to
justice. Indeed, a common policy justification for consumer class actions
is precisely that individual claims would not otherwise be pursued, given
the high costs of litigation compared to the relative low value of the
claim. Where the arbitration clause also prohibits consolidation, as was
the case in MacKinnon, that conclusion is probably inevitable. Indeed,
following the holding in MacKinnon, certification was effectively
granted in the B.C. and Ontario payday loans actions despite arbitration
53
clauses including class action waivers and non-consolidation provisos.
This result is somewhat surprising given that the Ontario court faced
different statutory language, specifically the absence of a reference to
"inoperability" in its arbitration legislation.5 4 The fact that the B.C. view
was persuasive outside that province suggests judicial agreement with
the underlying policy position regarding resolution of consumer
disputes. 55 The overall effect of the evolving jurisprudence pre-Dell was
to give implicit priority to class actions over arbitration in consumer
disputes whenever the facts allowed for such a result, thus suggesting an
underlying common policy on the issue.
If the pre-Dell Ontario judicial view was inspired by forthcoming
legislative changes in that province, the same cannot be said of British
Columbia where equivalent amendments were not, and are not currently,
anticipated. Still, the B.C. judicial approach is not equivalent to the
regime in place under the consumer protection legislation in Ontario and
Quebec. Indeed, the former provides for more nuances by subjecting the
evaluation of consumer arbitration to the nature of the claims involved as
opposed to rendering any pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause
unenforceable where consumer contracts are concerned. Whether the
B.C. jurisprudence is compatible with the Supreme Court's view of such
clauses, as expressed in Dell Computer, is a question that has been the
subject of intense litigation during the past months.
MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money Market Co., [2004] 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291 (B.C.C.A.).
In Ontario: Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2007 CanLII 186 (S.C.J.), leave to
appeal refused, [2007] O.J. No. 2160 (Div. Ct.). In B.C.: MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money
Mart Co., 2007 BCSC 348 (B.C.S.C.).
54. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., (2005) 8 B.L.R. (4 th) 159 (Ont. S.C.J.), appeal
quashed, (2005) 258 D.L.R. (4th) 453 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.CC. refused,
[2006] S.C.C.A. No. 528.
55. See also Saskatchewan Frey v. Bell Mobility Inc., [2006] S.J. No. 456 (Q.B.),
vacated, [2008] S.J. No. 105 (Q.B.).
52.

53.
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III. DELL: THE AFTERMATH
The Supreme Court's decision in the Dell Computers case has given
rise to a significant amount of commentary from an academic
perspective. 56 In terms of legal practice, a Canadian legal affairs
magazine has called Dell Computers "the most important Canadian case
affecting business from 2007." 57 Since its release in July of 2007, the
judgment has been referred to in 38 cases (as of 3 April 2009). In the
four most directly relevant cases, appellate courts have determined Dell's
effect in Ontario and British Columbia.
The four cases involve pre-dispute compulsory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. In addition to imposing arbitration as the exclusive
mode for dispute resolution, these clauses also prohibit any consolidation
of claims, whether within a judicial or arbitral procedure. In other
words, following American models, the contracts restrict formal dispute
resolution to individual arbitration. The first B.C. case, Mackinnon v.
Money Mart, continues the Money Mart saga discussed above and
mirrors the Ontario proceedings, Smith v. Money Mart.58 As noted
above, in both provinces, the courts had originally held that the
arbitration provisions in the consumer contracts were not an automatic
bar to a certification request and eventually did certify the actions. 9
After Dell was released, lawyers for Money Mart argued in both
jurisdictions that the earlier decisions on the arbitral clauses had been
erroneous given the holding in Dell.
In the B.C. case, Justice Brown held at first instance that the
relevant legislative provisions in Quebec and B.C. were sufficiently
different to lead to different conclusions on the effect of the arbitration

56. A recent volume of the Revue g~n~rale de droit published by the University of
Ottawa's Faculty of Civil Law includes seven commentaries on diverse aspects of the
case; all but one are in French. See (2007) vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 345 -5 14, including my
commentary: "La sphere d'application de l'article 3149 C.c.Q. et leconsommateur
qu~b~cois" at 463.
57. J. Melnitzer, "Top 10 Business Cases from 2007," Lexpert, Jan. 2008, at 94.
58. In B.C., MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 BCSC 710 [so-called
MacKinnon #5], reversed, 2009 BCCA 103 (March 13, 2009) and in Ontario, Smith v.
Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 CanLIl 27479, aff'd (2008) 92 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), leave
to appeal to the S.C.C. refused 5 March 2009. This entire post-Dell fiasco could well
have been avoided had the Supreme Court agreed to grant leave to appeal from the 2005
Smith decision (see supra note 54), which raised exactly the same questions as Dell but
within the legislative context of Ontario. The fact that the court refused Money Mart's
request to be joined to the Dell appeal could be argued to give further weight to the
argument that Dell only applies to Quebec. See discussion infra text accompanying note
64.
59. In Ontario: Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2007 CanLII 186 (S.C.J.), leave to
appeal refused, [2007] O.J. No. 2160 (Div. Ct.). In B.C.: MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money
Mart Co., 2007 BCSC 348 (B.C. S.C.).

1216

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

clause on a motion for certification.6 ° In the Ontario case, Justice Perell
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice forcefully rejected the claim that
the Supreme Court in Dell was implicitly speaking to the whole of
Canada:
In Dell Computer, Justice Deschamps, who writes the majority
judgment, focuses her remarks exclusively to the Civil Code of
Qurbec ....
In their factum and in their material for the motions now
before the court, the Defendants make much of the fact that because
of the presence of several intervenors from across Canada, the law
from across Canada was before the Supreme Court. However, in
Dell Computer, although the intervenors inundated the Supreme
Court with the law from other provinces, the court did not comment
and cannot be taken to have ruled on the Ontario legislature's design
for the relationship between arbitration agreements and class
proceedings, which is, of course, a moving target because the Ontario
legislature and the legislatures of the other provinces are free to do
something different from Quebec.
The Supreme Court did not purport to address the legislative choices
of other provinces. Justice Deschamps does not refer to the law in
other provinces or to the submissions of the intervenors. The
statutory and common law underpinning of the law in other parts of
the country is not mentioned, and I do not understand how it can be
that Justice Deschamps' judgment can overturn
settled case law in
61
those provinces without actually mentioning it.
This opening invited Perell J. to engage in an exercise of legislative
interpretation similar to the one originally undertaken by the B.C. courts
62
in its pre-Dell jurisprudence and adhered to post-Dell in MacKinnon,
but without the option of relying on the "inoperability" of the arbitration
clause since the Ontario arbitration legislation only refers to its
invalidity.63 The competing statute, the Ontario Class Proceedings Act,
1992, provides for essentially the same elements for certification as the
B.C. statute, including a preferability criterion at section 5(l)(d). While

60.

MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 BCSC 710 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), at para.

32-35.
61. Smith Estate v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2008 CanLII 27479 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para.
237-38.
62. It is worth noting that he also concluded that the amendments to the Ontario
Consumer Protection Act operated retroactively to declare unenforceable the arbitration
clauses in the relevant contracts. Id. at para. 122.
63. Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 S.O., ch. 17, s. 7. As in B.C., Ontario has one
statute for domestic commercial arbitration and another for the international cases. See
International Commercial Arbitration Act, 1990 R.S.O., ch. 1.9, and Arbitration Act, 1991

S.O., ch. 17.
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the Ontario arbitration legislation does not expressly refer to
"inoperability" as grounds for refusing a stay, the court in Smith did not
see this as an impediment. Indeed, Justice Perell considered previous
cases from Ontario and other Canadian common law jurisdiction to
conclude that
while [Dell] may articulate the law about such things as the scope of
an arbitrator to determine his or her own jurisdiction to arbitrate a
dispute, the cases do not overrule the law that a court in Ontario or
British Columbia may determine whether to stay or not stay an action
within the context of the preferable procedure analysis of a
certification motion.64
It is unfortunate but perhaps not surprising that the Ontario Court of
Appeal granted leave in Smith but dismissed the appeal on the narrow
issue estoppel point. Indeed, given the extensive analysis put forward by
Justice Perell, including numerous alternative approaches to resolving
the question, the Ontario court chose to maintain the uncertainty
plaguing the common law provinces in the post-Dell period, affecting
business, consumers and arbitrators alike. This decision to resist an
evaluation of the statutory question on the merits may be justified by its
hypothetical nature in light of the legislative priority given to class
proceedings over arbitration in the new version of the Ontario Consumer
Protection Act. It may also be related to the fact that the Supreme Court
had previously refused to grant leave to Money Mart to allow it to join
the Dell appeal. Since the Supreme Court does not give reasons on leave
applications, but given that the issue in Dell was precisely the issue in
Money Mart, the Ontario Court of Appeal was placed in the unenviable
position of having to second guess the Supreme Court, which it deftly
avoided by restricting its decision to an unrelated point. Such a posture
was not available to the B.C. Court of Appeal, who was very recently
forced to grapple with the challenge, as did the two lower courts in that
province.
Indeed in the second post-Dell B.C. case, Seidel v. Telus
Communications Inc.,65 the interpretive argument was raised and at trial,
Justice Masuhara decided to consider the question anew, despite Justice
Brown's recent conclusion in MacKinnon #5. Justice Masuhara
concluded first that despite divergent language on certification criteria,
Quebec and B.C. law on certification is largely convergent. It was,
rather, the arbitration legislation that was the basis for distinguishing
Dell's effect in B.C. Reiterating the point made at the Court of Appeal

64. Smith, 2008 Can~lI 27479, at para. 284.
65. 2008 BCSC 933 (CanLII).

1218

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

by Justice Levine in the pre-Dell, 2004 MacKinnon decision,66 Masuhara
underlined the use of "inoperable" in section 15 of the Commercial
Arbitration Act, a term not to be found in the Quebec legislative sources.
The court observed, in particular, the different role played by courts
under the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure's main provision on arbitral
clauses:
940.1. Where an action is brought regarding a dispute in a matter on
which the parties have an arbitration agreement, the court shall refer
them to arbitration on the application of either of them unless the case
has been inscribed on the roll or it finds the agreement null. The
arbitration proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or pursued
and an award made at any time while the case is pending before the
court.
According to Masuhara, this provision provides that the only ground for
refusing to send parties to arbitration is the nullity of the arbitration
clause. No other bases-notably that the clause is "void," "inoperable,"
or "otherwise incapable of being applied"-are available in Quebec,
although these alternatives are mentioned in the B.C. legislation.67
Moreover, that more complete enumeration parallels the language used
in both the New York Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards and the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, international instruments that
are part of Canadian law.68
In Telus, the court attempted to distinguish Dell by relying on the
Supreme Court's reference to international sources, sources which were
irrelevant to the domestic arbitration situation faced by the parties in
Telus. The domestic nature of the case in B.C. was reinforced by the fact
that the applicable statute was the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA), as
opposed to the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA). Of
course the flaw in this distinction lies with the fact that the arbitration in
Dell was treated as a domestic arbitration. That was a critical point
initially made by the Supreme Court, one that allowed it to exclude the
special jurisdictional rule invoked by the plaintiff to avoid the arbitration
clause.69 Still, Masuhara did highlight the weakness in the Supreme
66. [2004] 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291 (B.C.C.A.) (case discussed supra).
67. This is the case for both the International Commercial Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Arbitration Act.
68. In Dell, the Supreme Court had noted that article 940.1 C.C.P. did not mirror the
language in either international instrument. Still, the Supreme Court did note that under
article 940.6, the provisions on arbitration in the C.C.P. are to be interpreted in light of
the Model Law on Arbitration, whenever interprovincial or international commercial
arbitration is an issue.
69. See discussion of article 3149 C.c.Q. supra. By concluding, as it did, that article
3149 C.C.Q. did not apply to the Dell case because no foreign elements were present, the
Supreme Court was implicitly declaring article 940.6 C.C.P. inapplicable to the case!
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Court's analysis in Dell where references to international instruments
and prevailing international trends were invoked for the purpose of
interpreting article 940.1 C.C.P. despite that court's own conclusion that
it was dealing with a purely domestic arbitration case.7 °
The strongest argument advanced in Telus turns on the scope of
authority granted to the arbitral tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction.
Here the ICAA and CAA diverge, with the former following the Model
Law that enshrines the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz for
international arbitration, and the latter remaining silent on the matter,
thereby preserving the court's full authority to deal with the issue. The
Supreme Court in Dell had held that the arbitral tribunal's power to
decide on its own jurisdiction was very broad under article 943 C.P.C.,
restricting judicial intervention to situations involving questions of law
where the facts were either irrelevant or merely incidental. 71 The lower
court in Telus found that this interpretation of the Quebec legislation did
not apply to the CAA in B.C. since no similar provision was to be found
in the B.C. statute. While this may appear to be a minor point in support
of the holding in Telus, it is noteworthy because it was not available to
the Ontario Court in the Smith decision discussed previously.
The apparent incompatibility between the Supreme Court's holding
in Dell and the British Columbia courts' jurisprudence explains why the
appeals in MacKinnon and Telus were joined and heard on an expedited
basis, with the judgment rendered less than two months following
audition of the appeals.72 In both cases, the B.C. Court of Appeal
concluded that the Dell decision did apply in the province, thus
overruling the original conclusions in both cases that certification of a
class action could render an arbitration clause "inoperative. 73
In the MacKinnon judgment, the B.C. Court of Appeal considered
the statutory interpretation arguments developed by Justice Brown in the

70. To say nothing, of course, about the fact that arbitration in a consumer case is
not equivalent to arbitration in a commercial case. Oddly this argument does not seem to
have been pressed by counsel for consumers in any of these cases.
71. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Frederic Bachand & Pierre
Bienvenu, L'arrtDell et le contr6le de la compktence arbitrale au stade du renvof i
l'arbitrage,37 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 477 (2007).

72. MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., 2009 BCCA 103; Seidel v. Telus
Commc'ns, 2009 BCCA 104.
73. MacKinnon, 2009 BCCA 103, at para. 2; Telus, 2009 BCCA 104, at para. 14. I
note that in Frey v. Bell Mobility Inc., [2008] SKQB 79 (Q.B.) (discussed supra), a

Saskatchewan court had also concluded that Dell had changed the law regarding the
interplay between class actions and arbitration and reversed its previous decision to refer
the arbitration issue to the certification judge. The judgment did not provide any
reasoning for its conclusions regarding Dell. Oddly, it was not mentioned by the B.C.
Court of Appeal in either MacKinnon or Telus.
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lower court but rejected them all.74 The summary of those findings is
succinctly captured in the companion Telus judgment:
As explained by Madam Justice Newbury in MacKinnon (2009), it
was held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dell... that a class
action is a procedural vehicle that does not modify or create
substantive rights. While an arbitration clause in a contract deals
with a procedure for resolving disputes between the parties to the
contract, it nevertheless creates substantive rights and canot [sic] be
modified by the procedural provisions applicable to class actions.
There are broad similarities between the arbitration and class action
legislation of Quebec and British Columbia, and the technical
differences between the laws of the two provinces are not material to
the analysis
of whether the reasoning in Dell ...extends to British
75
Columbia.

It is worth noting that in making this determination, Justice Newbury
focused on the common genesis of arbitration legislation in both
provinces, being the New York Convention and Model Arbitration Law,
without mentioning the fact that these are addressed to commercial, not
consumer arbitration.76
The focus on the "purely procedural" nature of consolidation and
the "substantive right" created by a contractual arbitration clause stands
in contrast to the nuanced approach adopted by the same court, though
differently constituted, that rendered the original MacKinnon judgment
in 2004. In that case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal had accepted
that the economics of consumer claims could make consolidation the
only viable option for redress. 77 This underpinned the whole notion of
dealing with arbitration within the preferability criterion of certification
which characterized the pre-Dell jurisprudence in that province, as well
as in Ontario. Having lost that option, consumers in B.C. may have one
last argument remaining.
Indeed, in the original MacKinnon judgment, the B.C. Court of
Appeal had set aside arguments of unconscionability that had been
successfully raised to defeat consumer arbitration clauses in some
American courts. 78 In so doing, the court stated: "It is not necessary that
the court conclude that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable
because it is 'unconscionable'; the test is whether the arbitration
agreement is 'inoperative' in the face of a procedure that the court finds

74. MacKinnon, 2009 BCCA 103, at para. 66, 68 and 72.

75. Telus, 2009 BCCA 104, at para. 14.
76. MacKinnon, 2009 BCCA 103, at para. 62
77. MacKinnon v. Nat'l Money Mart Co., (2004) 50 B.L.R. (3d) 291, at para. 47.

78. Id. at para. 46.
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'preferable."' 79 Now that the statutory argument of "inoperability" has
been rejected in light of Dell, it remains to be seen whether the
contractual argument of "unconscionability" may be reintroduced. The
authority of Dell may be such that the B.C. courts will prefer to leave the
regulation of consumer arbitration to the provincial legislature, given the
precedent established by Ontario and Quebec.
Despite the B.C. Court of Appeal's judgment on the substantive
point, Money Mart will still be forced to defend the class action in that
province. Indeed, as in Ontario, the plaintiff succeeded on the issue
estoppel argument, having shown that the original decision not to send
the parties to arbitration had been conclusively determined between the
parties and that no special circumstances existed to justify an exception
to the finality of that conclusion.80 As no issue estoppel argument was
available in Telus, the B.C. Court of Appeal's decision in that case
means that the consumers will be forced to pursue their claims through
arbitration. Unlike the Money Mart clause, the Telus arbitration clause
does not specifically exclude consolidation
within arbitral proceedings, a
8
point left untouched in the judgment. '
The last case worth mentioning here was released after the Ontario
Court of Appeal's judgment in Smith v. Money Mart but before the B.C.
Court of Appeal's judgment in MacKinnon v. Money Mart. I refer here
to Griffin v. Dell Canada,s2 where a trial judge in Ontario adopted Justice
Perell's reasoning in Smith v. Money Mart to certify a class action in the
face of an arbitration clause. In do doing, Justice Lax noted that the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Smith v Money Mart had dismissed the
appeal on estoppel grounds without addressing the question of Dell
Computers' effect on the law of Ontario.83 Because Perell's reasons
were so closely tied to B.C. caselaw that was just overturned by the B.C.
Court of Appeal in MacKinnon v. Money Mart, as discussed above, the
current trial court jurisprudence in Ontario rests on a fragile foundation.
This leads to the conclusion that the present legal landscape for
consumer arbitration across Canada can be fairly described as chaotic.
There appears to be a significant divergence of judicial opinion on the
question of policy regarding pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, particularly as these clauses interact with procedures
for collective judicial action. The fracture does not appear to be
horizontal, i.e. between judges from the different provinces, but rather
vertical, i.e. between trial and appellate court judges in the three most
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at para 81.
Seidel v. Telus Commc'ns, 2009 BCCA 104, at para. 4.
2009 CanLIl 3557 (Ont. S.C.J.)
Id. at para. 32.
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populous and economically significant provinces and the nine judges
sitting at the Supreme Court of Canada. 84 The pro-arbitration stance
espoused by the latter court in all matters, from commercial to consumer
disputes and including copyright cases, 85 seems to have met serious
resistance from inferior courts. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
has only recently bowed to the Supreme Court's decision in Dell while
the Ontario Court of Appeal has declined at its first opportunity to take a
stand. Beyond the courts, the Supreme Court's policy position on
consumer arbitration is directly contrary to the most recent legislative
pronouncement in two key provinces, thereby seriously undermining any
suggestion that its judicial view is derived from common principles of
law in Canada or that it should be persuasive beyond the confines of the
Dell case. It is also difficult to ignore the irony of the Supreme Court
putting forward what it presents as arguments of principle drawn from
Quebec law that have been explicitly rejected by the Quebec legislature
whose views are paramount!
The litigation that has followed Dell leading to the very recent
decisions from the Ontario and B.C. courts of appeal demonstrates that
the issue facing consumer arbitration in Canada cannot, and should not,
be resolved by way of technical arguments based on statutory
interpretation shielding positions drawn from policy. To this end, it is
incumbent on jurists arguing or commenting on ongoing litigation to
frame the issues in terms of policy and to offer arguments drawn from
policy. But unless Canadian courts are willing to go beyond the largely
outdated clich6s regarding the "merely procedural" aspects of class
actions as they apply to consumer disputes, it may well be that legislators
will be invited to intervene and to modify the post-Dell effect outside
Ontario and Quebec. Regardless of the forum for discussion, arguments
for and against (individual) consumer arbitration will have to be more
original and sophisticated than what has recently been offered. Fertile
ground for new ideas is often found just outside one's own window. To
this I turn in the final section of this paper, for a brief glance at
developments in Europe and elsewhere in the Americas.
IV. COMPETING VISIONS OF CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION?
While the debate about the advisability of pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts continues unabated in the

84. While there was a dissenting opinion in Dell, the court was unanimous in its
conclusion that arbitration policy could trump class actions policy in the absence of
specific legislative language providing for a different hierarchy.
85. See Desputeaux v. Editions Chouette (1987) Inc., [2003] SCC 17.
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United States, 86 the question seems to have excited less passionate, or
virulent, commentary elsewhere. Two factors may explain the situation
in Canada:
first, recourse to such clauses is a relatively new
phenomenon; and second, until the Dell Computer case, courts tended to
give priority to collective judicial action in consumer cases even in the
face of an arbitration clause. In Europe, the issue has attracted little
negative attention given the apparent assumption that this type of clause
is likely to be unenforceable under the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts.87 Indeed, that piece of European law includes predispute mandatory arbitration clauses in a list of presumed unfair terms
and a recent decision from the European Court of Justice in the Claro
case supports that view. 8
In Claro, a consumer defaulted on a cell phone contract and the
service operator made its claim through the arbitral institution named in
the contract. 89 The tribunal rendered an award against the consumer who
had appeared and defended on the merits. 90 The consumer challenged
the award in judicial proceedings on the basis that the arbitration clause
was unfair and therefore unenforceable under the Directive.91 Using the
referral mechanism, the Spanish court asked the following question to
the European Court of Justice:
May the protection of consumers under Council Directive
93/13/EEC... [of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts] require the court hearing an action for annulment of an
arbitration award to determine whether the arbitration agreement is
void and to annul the award if it finds that that arbitration agreement
contains an unfair term to the consumer's detriment, when that issue

is raised in the action for annulment 92but was not raised by the
consumer in the arbitration proceedings?
The ECJ answered in the affirmative and declared that the consumer
protection objectives at the heart of the Directive mandated that the
86. See the extensive references cited in Eisenberg, supra note 1.
87. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts (0.1. 1993, L 95/29). An annex to the Directive lists a series of supposed
unfair terms that include, as l(q), terms "excluding or hindering the consumer's right to
take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions,
unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract."
88. Case C-168/05, Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL, 2006
ECR 1-10421.
89. Id.at para. 17.
90. Id.
91. Id. at para. 18.
92. Id.at para. 20.
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validity of the arbitral clause be considered by the national court, even at
that late stage, to ensure that the inequality of bargaining power between
93
the parties be kept in check on the issues covered by the Directive.
According to one commentator, the ECJ's recent jurisprudence is
incompatible with the Canadian Supreme Court's views on arbitral
authority where consumer transactions are involved; instead, judges are
seen as the guardians of the consumer interest and therefore required to
intervene to verify the fairness of arbitration clauses that limit
consumers' access to courts.94
More recently, the European Commission has indicated, in a policy
paper, that it intends to maintain, and reinforce, consumer choice of
dispute resolution mechanisms, thereby restricting business' option to
impose arbitration or any other single method of resolving contractual
disputes between the parties. 95 The future of consumer arbitration in
Europe lies, therefore, in convincing consumers that this dispute
resolution model is effective, efficient, and fair, such that consumers will
choose it once a dispute has reached the stage where third-party
adjudication is required. This is not inconsistent with the approach put
96
forward in a recent OECD policy paper on consumer dispute resolution
where the emphasis is placed on providing a diverse of set of
mechanisms from which the consumer can choose.
This divergent landscape in Europe is no doubt connected to the fact
that American-style damages class actions are not generally available in
Europe (yet).97 Given the prevalence of class action waivers alongside

93. Id. at para. 36.
94. Elise Poillot, Regards europ~ens sur la d~cision de la Cour suprdme du Canada
Dell Computer, 37 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 491, 511 (2007). For English-language
commentary on the Claro case, see Christoph Liebscher, 'Case C-168/05, Elisa Maria
Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL', 45 COMMON MARKET L.R. 545-557 (2008)
and Arthur E. Appleton, Bemd Ulrich Graf, 'ElisaMaria Mostaza Claro v Centro M6vil
Milenium: EU Consumer Law as a Defence against Arbitral Awards, ECJ Case C168/05', 25 ASA BULLETIN 48, 48-64 (2007). This expansive view of consumer
protection when interpreting uniform community law can be contrasted with the ECJ's
negative view of national consumer protection legislation that can be seen as
undermining the common market. For a full discussion, see Angus Johnston & Hannes
Unberath, 'The double-headedapproach of the ECI concerning consumer protection',44
COMMON MARKET L.R. 1237-1284 (2007).
95. Directive on Consumer Rights (COM(2008) 614). This proposal follows the
overall review of consumer protection policy in the Green Paper on the Review of the
Consumer Acquis (Feb. 2007), both available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/
consacquisen.htm)
96. OECD, OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress,
(July, 12 2007), availableat: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/3896010 .pdf.
97. This landscape is rapidly changing. See NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION: COMBINING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT (F. Cafaggi & H.-W.

Micklitz eds., Kluwer Intersentia, forthcoming 2009).
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arbitral clauses in consumer contracts in North America, 98 it may be that
business has less to gain from consumer arbitration since there is no
current need in Europe to avoid class actions. In other words, there is
likely less business pressure on EU institutions to change the law
regarding consumer arbitration in the absence of the threat of collective
action; instead energies are being spent opposing the never-ending
proposals for collective consumer action that have now become the focus
of a formal European Commission proposal. 99
Closer to home, the Organization for American States (OAS) for
several years has been exploring the opportunity of harmonizing the legal
landscape for transborder consumer transactions.
The Brazilian
delegation to the OAS has brought forward a proposal for uniform
choice-of-law rules.
The U.S. delegation has favored legislative
guidelines on dispute resolution mechanisms. The Canadian side has
suggested rules to identify the applicable law and the appropriate judicial
forum for adjudicating transborder consumer disputes, which are put
forward as a model law. 100 The three proposals not only suggest
different types of instruments (treaty, model law, legislative guide) but
also focus on divergent means of seeking harmonization (choice-of-law
rules, judicial jurisdiction, dispute resolution models).
The three
proposals seem to be pursuing a common objective of facilitating
transborder consumer transactions, notably internet purchasing. In
focusing on rules to identify the applicable law, the Brazilian document
underscores that such transactions can be treated differently from
domestic contracts, all the while respecting relevant consumer protection
policies in place in the various jurisdictions involved. This may well be
indicative of a view of the judicial role in consumer protection that is
incompatible with a system where arbitration is the default rule for
resolution of consumer disputes. The U.S. focus on dispute resolution
suggests either a lack of serious concern about substantive law issues,
perhaps showing greater confidence in arbitration or assuming greater
harmony of consumer law policies in the Americas.
Still, the view that consumer disputes should not be systematically
excluded from the courts is also reflected in several domestic U.S.
initiatives, at the state and federal levels. Most recently, an "Arbitration
Fairness Act" to prohibit pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer, and other, contracts was put forward in both houses but died
98. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 16.
99. See Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Greenpaper on Consumer Redress (Nov. 27,
2008), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redresscons/collectiveredressen.htm.
100. On file with the author. The OAS website is not particularly fruitful as a source
for these proposals, some of which are out-of-date: see http://www.oas.org/cji/dil-cji-cdmay2005/dil/CIDIP-VIl_home.htm.
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on the books at the close of the current session.10 1 Prior to that, several
state legislatures sought to restrict the impact of such clauses through
legislation but with little effect whenever the issue was pre-empted by
room for exceptions to
the Federal Arbitration Act, which leaves no
02
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the
of
nature
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arbitration
Despite the U.S. and Canadian supreme courts' statements to the
contrary, one might be tempted to conclude that there is evidence of
convergence in most western legal systems against the enforcement of
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and in
favor of the maintenance of consumers' access to state courts for the
resolution of their disputes. To do so might involve concluding that the
current situation in the U.S., which has migrated north to Canada, is an
anomaly flowing from a specific statutory instrument particular to
American federal law. Viewed in this light, it may be surprising that the
Canadian Supreme Court would have followed its U.S. counterpart's
path in the absence of an equivalent statutory imperative in Canada.
What is less surprising, however, is that provincial legislatures in Canada
have intervened to maintain consumers' access to courts and that
appellate judges had until recently arrived at the same conclusion even in
the absence of explicit statutory language to that effect. In other words,
the diversity in Canada mirrors the diversity in the U.S. but in a manner
that is both visible and effective for domestic and transborder commerce.
The view from Canada compromises the legal certainty regarding
consumer arbitration that currently prevails for U.S. companies doing
business across state lines. While Dell may have given them the
impression that crossing the Canadian border would not affect the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, the reality is
otherwise in Ontario and Quebec, and has only just been addressed
through judicial pronouncements in two other provinces. On this issue,
then, we may be inclined to reach for the lesser known warning caveat
venditor.10 3 Should that give rise to some rebalancing of interests in
consumer dispute resolution, it may well be envisaged as a civilization of
(consumer) arbitration.

101. A Bill to Amend Chapter 1 of title 9 of United States Code with Respect to
Arbitration (Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007), H.R. 3010 and S. 1782, 110th Cong.
(2007).
102. The literature on this issue is monumental; see references in Eisenberg, supra
note 1. For a discussion of various federal proposals and state legislation, see E. BRUNET
ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 157-71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).

103. Meaning, of course, "seller beware," as opposed to the more commonly heard
caveat emptor, "buyer beware."

